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Photo by Matthew Behrens
The children of Jaballah (left) and Mahjoub (right) play “ring around the CSIS” during a March 2009 demonstration at Toronto CSIS office.

By Matthew Behrens
Briarpatch Magazine
May/June 2009

Public outrage over the treatment of Canada’s “security certificate” detainees has receded with the seemingly good news that four of the five detainees are now living at home. But the reality of house arrest is almost worse, because it effectively extends the almost total loss of freedom the men endure to their wives, children and friends.

Imagine the government has declared you a threat to national security, but you’re not allowed to know why. You spend upwards of seven years behind bars under a secretive, arbitrary process reminiscent of a Kafka novel. You watch your children grow up through thick glass in weekly intervals of 20-minute visits, unable to hug and kiss them. Your life is haunted by the threat of deportation to torture.

After all this, the prospect of house arrest might sound like paradise. But even this improvement in your condition becomes a nightmare under some of the most draconian bail conditions ever seen in Canada.

You have a large device affixed to your leg that is linked to a GPS satellite, tracking your every move. To charge the device’s battery, you must sit plugged into an electrical outlet for two uninterrupted hours a day. You cannot sleep during the charging because if you turn the wrong way you might upset the delicate pins in the device.

Video cameras and alarms are placed in your home at all entrances and selected windows, and you must ensure your residence has a parking spot for the government agents who are charged with your 24-7 surveillance. All of your phone conversations, including those with your lawyers, are monitored and recorded for analysis by counter­terrorism officials. All of your mail, from bills to birthday cards, is intercepted by state agents who make duplicates of it so that special “counterterrorism analysts” can determine whether your partner’s Sears bill reveals any “trends” or “codes” that might be deemed detrimental to national security.

What sounds like a dystopian sci-fi stomach-turner is in fact a growing trend in Canadian state surveillance of individuals who seek bail in certain high-profile cases, especially those subject to security certificates.

For almost two decades, security certificates have allowed for the indefinite detention of refugees and permanent residents on undisclosed national security grounds and, although declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2007, they remain in place with minor modifications.

This Star Chamber-like process has made Canada the subject of criticism from numerous United Nations bodies, as well as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and members of all Canadian political parties. But public outrage over the certificates and especially the conditions under which the detainees have been held (some spent years in unheated solitary confinement cells) has receded with the seemingly good news that four of the five detainees are now living at home.

But the almost total control exercised over every aspect of these men’s lives while in jail - men who have never been convicted of any crime - has now been extended to their family members, their court-approved supervisors and any friends who venture to visit or call.

There has been little media coverage of the insidious manner in which the bail conditions can turn a simple trip to the corner store for milk into a complicated process that requires delicate negotiations with state agents along with the constant fear that a simple error (perhaps going to the wrong corner store) could land you back in jail. Nor has there been much documentation of the devastating psychological and physical impact on all those whose lives are touched by these conditions.

“When my Dad was coming out, I thought life was going to be easier, we were going to actually be a proper family,” says 15-year-old Afnan Jaballah, whose father, Mahmoud, has been targeted by CSIS since the late 1990s. “But looking at it now, it’s pathetic and hard. We haven’t done anything wrong. We’re not terrorists. We’re not anything. We’re just normal human beings following our religion. Nobody should be following us. Nobody should be looking at us.”

Afnan describes the difficulty of having friends over, given the video cameras placed on the outside of their home and the fact that friends who do accompany the family on government-approved public outings find they are constantly followed by Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers who wear bullet-proof vests, sidearms and dark glasses. “Some friends, when they see this, they get scared and don’t bother coming on outings with me. I’m losing my friends. It is really hard.”

This typical Canadian teenager, like others in security certificate families, feels that she herself is being punished, and is becoming socially isolated because of the secret allegations against and overt surveillance of her father.

It’s enough to produce a rift in the closest of families. Anyone familiar with the potential stress of planning a weekend trip to an amusement park or mall with a group of children and their friends might begin to appreciate the problems likely to arise when such trips must be approved a week in advance since the friends’ parents need state permission to meet your husband. In addition, the trip is subject to rigorous route restrictions (no unplanned bathroom breaks or donut shop excursions), and you will be followed by CBSA officers in a manner that makes all members of the group feel like they’re featured guests on America’s Most Wanted.

“Right now, I hate the word ‘outing’ because of what is happening,” Afnan’s brother, 13-year-old Ali Jaballah, told a Federal Court judge last fall. Since the age of five, Ali has hoisted picket signs and distributed flyers in attempts to have his father released. Having grown up in the glare of media lights, he longs for private time with his family. But when he leaves the house with his father, he is constantly watching the agents who are watching him, and instead of enjoying a playground on a summer’s evening, he is incessantly asking what time it is, fearful they might miss his father’s 9 p.m. curfew. “I’m just worried they might take him back [to jail],” Ali says.

While each detainee is allowed a certain number of outings per week, all must be pre-approved at least three business days in advance. Outings are sometimes rejected without a reason given, though certain patterns have emerged around restricted access to locations that may be host to a high number of Muslims. Indeed, requests to attend Muslim Day at Canada’s Wonderland and the annual Eid gathering at Toronto’s Rogers Centre were rejected, while requests to go to crowded shopping malls have been approved. Mahmoud Jaballah reports that a visit to his daughter’s public high school parent-teacher night was approved, but his request to meet teachers at his younger children’s Islamic school was turned down.

None of this is called for in the court’s bail orders. Neither are the arbitrary decisions that have been made by CBSA, such as requiring pre-approved individuals to provide 48 hours notice of a visit, forcing said visitors to sign a jail-like log book or indefinitely cancelling any and all outings for a period of time for undisclosed reasons.

Detainees and their loved ones question why intrusive, eyes-on surveillance is necessary, especially when court-approved “supervisors” for the men, usually their wives, grown children and close friends, have already been tasked with monitoring the individual’s compliance with their conditions.

While officials with the CBSA maintain these are simply additional measures to ensure compliance, a formerly secret CBSA manual released in Federal Court this past February contradicts such rationalizations, revealing a very specific policy that uses house arrest as a cover for intelligence gathering.

Entitled “Security Certificate Case Monitoring,” the manual provides a skewed view that would likely scare and confuse CBSA officers tasked with following the detainees. Indeed, with headings like “There is no zero risk situation,” the manual repeatedly states that these individuals have “links to terrorism,” a specious and defamatory allegation that has never been proven in a fair and legal process.

Another bold-faced heading states, “National security must not be compromised.” Given that no rational discussion follows about what this means, coupled with the manual’s broad definition of risk - “the chance that something bad will occur” - it’s no wonder that CBSA officers come across as paranoid and unnecessarily harsh.

Under a section entitled “residence check,” officers are told they may enter a detainee’s house to conduct a search but must do so with respect. However, “where there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a potential risk, officer safety will take precedence over cultural, religious and gender considerations.” Given the sensationalistic manner in which CBSA presents the issue to its officers, it’s likely that officers are never more than a gut feeling away from concluding they have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is a potential risk.” Numerous complaints from detainees about the manner in which such sensitivity considerations have not always been respected support this conclusion.

It was the accumulation of such incidents that led detainee Mohammad Mahjoub to have himself returned to jail two years after his release. No longer able to witness the pain his family was experiencing, he insisted on being returned to the maximum security institution on the grounds of Millhaven Penitentiary built especially for the security certificate cases.

Like Jaballah’s children, Mahjoub’s kids have also been traumatized by the state’s handling of their father’s bail conditions. Violating the sanctity of the place often considered safest - home - can have profound and lasting effects on kids, as when Mahjoub’s children came home one day last summer to discover that their new Wii had been seized by CBSA officers while they were out. The explanation was that the game may have an Internet-capable connection (about which no one in the family was aware). One of his bail conditions prohibits Internet access for Mr. Mahjoub.

Mona Elfouli, the children’s mother, explains, “You could see how angry and screaming and crying the kids were. Why did they do that to us? They don’t let us have any fun at all. They take anything that we enjoy.” The family’s efforts to have the game returned, promising to keep it in a locked room that Mr. Mahjoub could not access, took over six months.

A short time after losing their Wii, the Mahjoub kids purchased a pet snake. The next day one of them refused to go to school, acting out and crying constantly. Eventually, as Ms. Elfouli relates it, “he said he didn’t want to come back from school and see that his pet was gone. He was afraid the CBSA would take it.”

Photo by Matthew Behrens
Ali Jaballah and his mother, Husnah Al Mashtouli, demonstrate to clear the name of their loved one, detainee Mahmoud Jaballah, in Toronto.

THE MAHJOUB AND JABALLAH families no longer host the gatherings of friends that once marked their lives. Individuals wishing to be approved as visitors must provide personal information, including the name and address of their employers, as well as a picture (the idea of which must send shivers of fear throughout the Muslim community, where targeting based on false information or the loosest of guilt-by-association allegations can have devastating consequences). Given that all information collected by the CBSA goes onto a central anti-terrorism database in Ottawa, there is no telling with whom the information is subsequently shared, either within the Canadian government or abroad. The recent cases of Abdullah Almalki, Muayyed Nureddin, Ahmad El Maati and Maher Arar, all Canadians tortured abroad based on false and inflammatory allegations by CSIS and the RCMP, are cautionary tales for a community that is targeted and harassed by those very agencies. (See Lorne Brown’s review of the book Dark Days in this issue.)

While some might dismiss such fears as paranoia, the CBSA document illustrates just how well-founded they are. The section on phone taps states that “telephone monitoring can also be a valuable source of information on the ISSC [individual subject to security certificate] as well as their supervisor and associates” (i.e., their friends, none of whom are subject to security certificates but all of whom are now the subject of investigation).

The CBSA document then states that telephone taps are “most beneficial after a catalyst event, such as a residence search, interview, spot check or interactions during an outing or appointment. These occurrences, along with what the ISSC says and who they say it to, could be valuable information that leads to additional targets.”

Additional targets? In essence, house arrest becomes a huge fishing expedition for the government. “Even when a breach of conditions is not apparent, the information may be beneficial for intelligence purposes,” the manual notes, adding, “Where possible, monitoring officers should attempt to gather intelligence for use by headquarters, the regions and other government departments.” Who knows where this “information-sharing” ends or the degree of harm that may come to individuals who could suddenly find themselves on no-fly lists, rendered to a third country or denied employment for mysterious reasons, all because of the secretive actions of overzealous, racially profiling agencies like CBSA, CSIS, the RCMP, Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice?

Both Mahjoub and Jaballah, as well as Mohamed Harkat (in Ontario) and Adil Charkaoui (in Quebec) have challenged such conditions, with Charkaoui successfully having most of them eliminated after four years of having to be accompanied everywhere by his mother or father. In the Ontario cases, however, judges have shown a great deal more deference to the government and its secret information.

A detainee knows that indefinite jail time will result from any breach. Yet if the government commits any violations, there is no penalty. This became clear when it was revealed that CSIS, one party to these proceedings, had been listening in on two years’ worth of solicitor-client phone calls at the request of the CBSA, a clear and well-understood violation of one of the bedrock principles of a democratic justice system.

While the Federal Court did issue an order calling on CSIS to stop listening to such calls, the judge hearing the case stated: “I don’t want to hear any more about it. It is done. It is over. It is finished. It has happened. We understand it happened. It is unfortunate, but there is nothing we can do to change the past. We can only look at what goes from here in terms of where it will go from here.”

But what role did those illegally obtained solicitor-client phone calls play in padding CSIS’ accusations against the detainees, their families and their friends? Where does the cycle of illegality and impunity end?

It is against this backdrop that all of the detainees and their families are preparing for the next stage in their long struggle to clear their names. Throughout 2009, “reasonableness” hearings will be taking place both in public and, without the detainees present, in parallel secret hearings in order to determine whether the security certificates will be upheld. This two-stage process leaves some wondering whether the public hearing is simply a show trial designed to give the appearance of fairness. While the new process allows for security-cleared lawyers to test some of the secret case evidence, they cannot speak about what happens behind closed doors, even with the detainee, nor are they allowed to cross-examine the government’s confidential informants, leaving the defendant no closer to knowing or being able to contest the case against him.

The stress of preparing for and attending such hearings - which will ultimately determine whether the detainees will be deported to torture, relegated to indefinite house arrest based on secret allegations they can never properly answer, or simply released - is difficult enough. To mount such a defence while dealing with the intricacies of house arrest and constant surveillance presents an almost incomprehensible challenge.

For the Toronto families, it has been a never-ending challenge to raise healthy, happy children in such an environment. As Mona Elfouli recently told a Federal Court judge:

“I brought my kids up to love everyone and to be there for everyone, and not to fear anyone and not to be angry at anyone. But my kids are growing up now, with the situation that we are in, because of the surveillance, because of coming in and taking things from them and making their life miserable, they started to say, ‘I hate CBSA.’

“I say, ‘Guys, you know what? We love everyone. Don’t say you hate them. Say, I hate their action. I don’t like it, and we can talk to them and get them to change it.’ When their dad was in detention, at the beginning they were small; they didn’t know. At the time, I wanted to explain to them. I said, ‘You know, you’re old enough to understand that your dad is in jail, and that’s not because he has done something wrong. It’s just the government are human beings and they sometimes make mistakes. And we talked to them [the government] and tried to help them to correct their mistake, and when it is corrected, your dad would be home.’

“It took a long time after I said that, and the children, I was afraid they wouldn’t trust what I said anymore. But then, their dad came home. And I said, ‘See, guys, we were able to make it.’”

Elfouli promised her pre-teen children that the same relentless persistence that brought their father home after seven years in jail will eventually end the house arrest that disrupts their daily lives. This past March, though, the family had had enough. Facing two impossible choices, the family decided to revoke Mr. Mahjoub’s bail and return him to prison. Elfouli is relying on opponents of security certificates to ensure another seven years don’t pass before their family can live under one roof, free from harassment and state control.

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By Lorne Brown
Briarpatch Magazine
May/June 2009

A review of:

Dark Days: The story of four Canadians tortured in the name of fighting terror
By Kerry Pither
Foreword by Maher Arar
Viking, 2008

Dark Days is about the imprisonment and torture of four innocent Canadians in Syria in the furtherance of the so-called “war on terror” launched by George W. Bush. The four men, all Muslims, are Maher Ahar (361 days in Syrian detention), Abdullah Almalki (more than 22 months in Syria), Ahmad El Maati (two years, two months and two days in Syria and Egypt) and Muayyed Nureddin (34 days in Syria). Not one of them was ever charged with any crime. Not one has ever had any connection to or any sympathy with al-Qaeda or any similar group. All are against terrorism in principle.

The book is based on almost five years of interviews, the findings of the Arar Inquiry report, documents and testimony presented to the Inquiry and other public documents. While Dark Days tells the story of the four men it also does an excellent job of relating their fate to a deteriorating political and human rights climate and demonstrating the culpability of Canadian officials.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, anti-Muslim hysteria was whipped up in the United States. This hysteria took the form of the Patriot Act, the harassment and imprisonment of thousands of American Muslims, the imprisonment and torture of people of various nationalities in secret CIA prisons around the world and in Guantanamo, and the “extraordinary rendition” of people to Syria, Egypt and other countries where torture was a regular feature of the penal system.

Canada responded with a lower-profile parallel of what happened in the United States, joining the invasion of Afghanistan and rolling back civil liberties on the domestic front. Those measures were driven by purely economic considerations. As then-Deputy Prime Minister John Manley said on more than one occasion, “we can’t have them build a wall around the United States and us be on the outside of it. . . . We’ll need to satisfy them.” The result of the need to “satisfy them” was the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act (ATA), which was an all-out assault on civil liberties and totally unnecessary to deal with actual terrorism. The many and diverse critics of the Act were ignored. With the enthusiastic support of the business elite and the Conservatives, the Liberal majority quickly passed the ATA with little debate.

The ATA was buttressed with a Canada-U.S. action plan which, among other things, integrated border and national enforcement teams, “effectively merging the FBI and RCMP, the CIA and CSIS, and American and Canadian border officials, complicating any possibility for effective civilian oversight of their work,” Pither writes.

The legislation was accompanied by a huge budget of $7.7 billion for CSIS, the RCMP, immigration and refugee screening, military spending, airport security and border initiatives. Pither asks the pertinent question and provides the obvious answer: “Did all this spending make Canadians feel safer? That seemed beside the point - the budget, like the ATA, was about making the United States feel better about Canada.”

Pither details how CSIS and the RCMP were only too happy to collaborate with the CIA and the FBI. They began with the type of harassment of the Muslim community that should never be tolerated in a democracy. Maher Arar refers to some of this harassment in the book’s foreword: “Most preferred to keep silent about the harassment they experienced: frequent and invasive visits from CSIS officers to interview them, often at odd times of the day, or unexpected visits at their workplace. These visits would often include the officer’s advice that it would be better not to seek the professional help of a lawyer.”

This generalized harassment, however, was mild compared to the treatment meted out to Arar, El Maati, Almalki and Nureddin once they became “subjects of interest” to CSIS. They were badgered for interviews, followed everywhere night and day and generally hassled until their lives were seriously disrupted. The RCMP were brought into the picture in the hope that they could arrest the “suspects” and prosecute them as “terrorists”, but there was utterly no evidence to support such actions.

Then-RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli and Jack Hooper, formerly of CSIS, informed a Senate Committee that, “particularly since 9/11, we have had to accept going to a disruptive mode” and “at the end of the day if prosecution is not viable, there are other techniques.” The “other techniques” included the harassment mentioned above, as well as supplying false information to the FBI, the CIA, and Canadian and U.S. Customs. For instance, without an iota of evidence, they issued a “border lookout” describing Maher Arar, his wife, Monia Mazigh, and “other individuals” as “a group of Islamic Extremist individuals suspected of being linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist movement.” There would be many more such falsehoods fed to American authorities about Arar, Mazigh and the others by CSIS and the RCMP. When U.S. authorities “rendered” Arar to Syria for torture they made it clear that they were acting on information supplied by the Canadians.

Ahmad El Maati was detained on November 12, 2001; Abdullah Almalki on May 3, 2002; Maher Arar on September 22, 2002; and Muayyed Nureddin on December 11, 2003. All four spent most of their prison time at a notorious prison in Damascus known as Far’Falastin, where they were held in underground cells and tortured and interrogated with information from Canada.

The parts of the book dealing with this imprisonment and torture make for difficult reading and should make any Canadian ashamed that officials of our government were accessories to such barbarity. The cells were more like graves. They were three by six by seven feet with no light, heat or mattress. They were overrun with insects and rats. Prisoners remained constantly in their cells except for a two-minute bathroom break per day and for interrogation sessions often accompanied by torture. They did not see other prisoners and could communicate only by whispers between cells - they were beaten if they were caught doing so. The food was inadequate and often rotten. The torture sessions were frequent and horrendous, and often lasted hours at a time. Whipping with a steel cable was common, especially on the soles of the feet. Being suspended in a tire and whipped on various parts of the body was common. Electric shocks were used. Punching and kicking were common even when prisoners were not being interrogated.

While these horrors were going on in Far’Falastin, CSIS was attempting to get permission from Syrian intelligence to interview Canadian prisoners and, when this was denied, sent intelligence-gathering questions to be asked on their behalf. CSIS and the RCMP also did their best to create the impression with the Syrian authorities that Canada would prefer the four be kept imprisoned in Far’Falastin.

Had Maher Arar not been so fortunate as to be married to Monia Mazigh, he and the others might still be in prison or worse. Monia did not buy into the “quiet diplomacy” argument some Canadian diplomats were then mouthing and began a courageous and sophisticated public campaign to bring Maher Arar back to Canada and establish his innocence. She was soon joined in this campaign by Alex Neve of Amnesty International, Riad Saloojee from the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations, Kerry Pither and many others.

Monia Mazigh and her supporters waged a campaign which eventually rallied enough people to force the government to call for the release of the prisoners and their return to Canada. Maher Arar was the first to be released; he and Mazigh then began a campaign to demand a public inquiry which would clear his name and determine what role Canadian officials played in the outrage. It was an uphill battle in which volunteers with few resources were pitted against the resources of the state and a milieu in which much of the media was hostile. The government relied on “leaks” of false information, much of it obtained under torture, to co-operative journalists. The purpose was to destroy Arar’s reputation and make it impossible to get to the bottom of what actually happened.

The vicious campaign backfired, however, and the government eventually bowed to public pressure. In February 2004 they appointed Justice Dennis O’Connor, Associate Chief Justice of Ontario, commissioner of the Arar Inquiry. O’Connor would prove to be an honest and conscientious commissioner who tried to get to the bottom of things despite being blocked at every turn by CSIS, the RCMP and officials from other government agencies. Many of the documents he did obtain were heavily redacted.

Despite the obstacles, O’Connor’s report completely exonerated Maher and was sharply critical of the RCMP, CSIS, elements of the media and the role of some Canadian diplomatic officials in contributing to the outrage. O’Connor recommended that there be a separate inquiry into the cases of El Maati, Almalki, and Nureddin. He also recommended that the government implement a program to better oversee the RCMP, CSIS and other agencies to prevent such abuse in the future.

So far only a few of O’Connor’s recommendations have been implemented. The government accepted that Arar was completely innocent, issued an apology and paid compensation, though no amount of money can restore what they helped destroy. In December 2006, retired Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci was appointed as commissioner of an “Internal Inquiry” to examine the role of Canadian officials in the imprisonment and torture (the government calls it “mistreatment”) of El Maati, Almalki and Nureddin. Unfortunately the word “internal” has governed the workings of the Iacobucci Inquiry on the specious grounds of “national security.” There have been only two days of public hearings and the victims, their lawyers and other interested parties have not even been allowed to see the key documents. The report of the Iacobucci Inquiry may yet prove useful, but in the meantime El Maati, Almalki and Nureddin continue to live broken lives, hoping for redress.

Meanwhile, CSIS, the RCMP and the Canadian government have shown few signs of changing their ways. No action has been taken on O’Connor’s recommendations for improved oversight of security agencies. CSIS and the RCMP are both completely unrepentant and continue in their old ways. Both agencies think they’re above the law and complain bitterly that they should be subjected to any accountability. RCMP Chief Superintendent Ben Soave, crucially involved with this dirty work for the RCMP, has dismissed the scrutiny arising from federal inquiries as “judicial terrorism.” Jack Hooper, former deputy director of CSIS, describes it as “legal jihad.” Pither points out that cases similar to those detailed in her book have come to light more recently. One still unfolding right now is that of Abousfian Abdelrazik, who was detained and tortured in Sudan at the request of CSIS. He has now been cleared by CSIS, the RCMP and the Sudanese authorities but the Harper government continues to obstruct his return to Canada. Presumably they fear what he might have to say.

The final outrage is that the perpetrators of these crimes have not been brought to justice. Those responsible have broken several Canadian and international laws and international conventions signed by Canada. Fortunately, torture is illegal and so are actions aiding and abetting the practice. There are now people in the United States preparing legal cases against members of the former Bush administration for torture. Hopefully some progressive and enterprising lawyers will initiate a similar process in Canada.

All of the author’s proceeds from the sale of Dark Days will go to Amnesty International Canada.

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By Michael Skinner
The Bullet (Socialist Project)
April 25, 2009

The fact that the Taliban is a party of the peasant classes, but certainly not the only one, is not news in Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is thus interesting that The New York Times (“Taliban Exploit Class Rifts to Gain Ground in Pakistan,” 16 April 2009) is now exploiting the fact the Taliban do represent significant groups of peasants as if this is news. This indication of a possible reframing of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a class war is significant as the U.S. escalates the intensity and scale of warfare in the region.

My Afghan-Canadian research partner, Hamayon Rastgar, has said many times since we returned from a research trip in Afghanistan that “the West gives the monopoly of anti-imperialism to the Taliban” by crushing and continuing to suppress socialist forces in Afghanistan and by portraying the complex insurgency in the simplistic way Western governments and media do.

Many non-violent resisters as well as various insurgent groups oppose the Taliban, the mujaheddin, and imperialist forces. The complexity of the resistance and insurgent forces remain opaque to most Western analysts. Articles by Afghan intellectuals engaged in non-violent resistance against all the forces of repression – the Taliban, the mujaheddin, and the Western forces – are rarely translated for Western readers. Westerners believe all insurgents are under a Taliban banner. However, as an Afghan Maoist leader told us: “The government credits the Taliban for every insurgent attack; the Taliban like to take the credit; and that works for everyone else at this moment.”

Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan State

It is important to recall that the militaries of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), from the U.S., Britain, Canada, and Australia, set the stage to institute a supposedly ‘democratic’ state in Afghanistan. However, this state is a reconstitution of the theocratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan originally instituted in 1992. The Islamic Republic was instituted by one of several competing mujaheddin factions who were built up as part of the U.S.’s anti-socialist “freedom fighters.” The later rise of the Talban, facilitated as it was by the Pakistani equivalent of the CIA, the ISI, was in good part a response to the horrors inflicted on Afghans by conflicts between the rival mujaheddin factions after 1992. Several of these factions retreated to the north, in 1996, fleeing from the advance of Taliban military forces. These mujaheddin factions formed the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, which the Western news media sanitised with the title Northern Alliance.

In an article in Briarpatch (March/April 2008) regarding the use and abuse of feminism to sell Canada’s war in Afghanistan, I wrote: “The Taliban are radical Islamists intent on isolating Afghans from the world; the mujaheddin are radical Islamists intent on profiting from their relationship to the U.S. and now Canada. The Taliban are reprehensible, but the mujaheddin are hardly different; both created misogynistic regimes based on erroneous interpretations of Islam.”

The Taliban and mujaheddin also share a hatred of ‘Godless’ socialists. It is still illegal, based on religious grounds, as it has been since 1992, to form a socialist party in the elected theocracy of Afghanistan. Freedom of religion is supposedly guaranteed by the new Afghanistan constitution. But in practice the state acts in a way that all Afghans are considered Muslim by default. This misses the incredible cultural diversity in Afghanistan, and the many religions including several unique indigenous ones, that Afghans practice. Moreover, socialists (which include an important organized Maoist component) are not likely to have suddenly found salvation in Islam. There is, it seems, no Islamic equivalent of Latin American liberation theology or Canadian Christian socialism in Afghanistan.

The kicker is that in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan apostasy is punishable by death. Any Afghan socialist could be ‘legally’ executed on the grounds she or he has converted from Islam. Moreover, the Afghan Supreme Court ruled socialists are legally atheists to ban socialist parties from electoral politics.

Despite this suppression, Afghan Maoists claim they have consolidated disparate Maoist and socialist organisations into a new party. The Maoists also claim they will eventually beat the Taliban in a competition for the hearts and minds of peasants, once the insurgency has exhausted the OEF-NATO occupation, which even Afghan liberals consider as an imperialist occupation.

Even Michael Ignatieff (2003), in his book Empire Lite, which is a collection of his New York Times essays, explicitly identifies the occupation of Afghanistan as imperialist. Ignatieff just happens to think this imperialist occupation is “humanitarian,” because, he argues, imposing a liberal world order in Central Asia is preferable to allowing people he claims are “barbarians” the autonomy to govern their own affairs. The fact that the hierarchical priorities of this liberal world order rank the accumulation of state power and individual wealth far above observation of international laws and human rights is, for Ignatieff, an inconvenient but unavoidable truth. Ignatieff’s complaint is that this empire needs to throw its weight around more forcefully to establish liberal world order – an argument the Obama administration seems to be implementing.

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By Dave Oswald Mitchell & Brent Erickson
Briarpatch Magazine
September/October 2008

The shaming of one Canadian has shamed all Canadians.”

-Liberal MP Paul Szabo, apologizing in the House of Commons for the RCMP’s treatment of lobbyist and arms dealer Karlheinz Schreiber. (Schreiber’s pants had fallen down while RCMP officers led him, in handcuffs, to a waiting cruiser after his testimony before the Commons Ethics Committee.)

You’re 15 years old, in the company of hardened militants who are associates of your father. A foreign army has invaded the country and unleashed a massive bombing campaign. Soldiers come knocking one morning and demand entry. The men around you refuse and a firefight ensues, culminating in the occupying air force bombarding the compound you’re in, killing everyone but you and one other person.

What happens next is disputed. As the soldiers enter the bombed-out compound a grenade is thrown and explodes near one of them. He later dies of his wounds. Based on witness reports, the thrower could have been one of three people: you, the man lying beside you, or a U.S. soldier outside the compound wall.

The man beside you is shot by an advancing soldier as he reaches for an AK-47 lying beside him. Cowering in the corner, you, in turn, are shot twice in the back. As shock sets in, you plead with the soldiers to kill you, to finish the job.

You are Omar Khadr. Your ordeal has barely begun.

~

It was a temporary but extremely telling setback. On June 4, 2007, U.S. military judges presiding over the Bush Administration’s hastily convened military tribunals threw out all war crimes charges against the only two Guantanamo prisoners facing trial at the time. One of the two prisoners was Omar Khadr, who had been charged with “murder in violation of the law of war, attempted murder in violation of the law of war, conspiracy, providing material support for terrorism and spying.” Khadr was 15 years old at the time of his capture.

The judge presiding over Khadr’s case determined he had no jurisdiction over detainees who had been designated “enemy combatants” (as Khadr and many other detainees were labelled in their Combatant Status Review Tribunals in 2004) rather than “alien unlawful enemy combatants,” the more precise term Congress had used in the legislation authorizing the tribunals. The Bush Administration argued that the difference between an “enemy combatant” and an “unlawful enemy combatant” is purely semantic. But is it?

Merely being an “enemy combatant” is not illegal, even according to the laws the U.S. introduced to retroactively prosecute those captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere. What the dismissal of charges introduced into the process was the suggestion that, even if Khadr had thrown a grenade and even if the fact that he was a child soldier who was tortured into confessing was somehow overlooked, the act of resisting an attack by an occupying army alone might not be cause for prosecuting him for war crimes.

As Dave Lindorff, writing for Pacific Free Press, has pointed out, “a fighter killing another fighter during warfare is not the act of a ‘terrorist.’ It may be brutal and it may be tragic, but it is the act of a soldier. That soldier, if captured, is not a criminal, but a POW. Moreover, if he is a child, the Geneva Conventions . . . require that he be treated not as a POW but as a victim of war.”

Khadr’s case, remember, was one of the first the Bush Administration chose to prosecute - a supposed “slam-dunk” designed to pave the way for future victories in the war on terror. The temporary dismissal of charges against Khadr, however, exposed the tribunal for what it was: a politically driven show trial devoid of legal or moral legitimacy.

Khadr’s victory was, of course, short-lived. On September 24, 2007, a hastily convened three-member panel of the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review overruled the decision to throw out the charges, reinstating terrorism charges against Khadr and Salim Hamdan, the other Guantanamo prisoner to have had his charges thrown out. In its ruling the appeals court parroted the Bush Administration line that the distinction between “enemy combatant” and “unlawful enemy combatant” was purely semantic, and that the military still had the authority to try those it had designated “enemy combatants.” The decision meant that prosecutors could move forward with their case against Khadr and other prisoners without having to convene new status tribunals.

Khadr now faces life in prison if convicted. And if acquitted? The U.S. maintains it would still have the right to detain him indefinitely, until such time as America’s war on terror is deemed to have ended.

So what, exactly, is the Pentagon’s case against Omar Khadr? In all the ink that has been spilled covering Khadr’s story, the Kafkaesque absurdity of the entire situation is easily lost in the accumulation of disputed details. With the approach of Khadr’s October trial date, timed to be rushed to completion before President George W. Bush leaves office early next year, Canadians would do well to review the sordid details of Khadr’s story - particularly in light of our own government’s shameful role in perpetuating the torture and abuse of Guantanamo’s youngest detainee.

The firefight in Ab Khail

It happened one morning in July 2002, when U.S. intelligence picked up activity on a satellite phone belonging to an al Qaeda field commander. Before long, U.S. and Afghan forces had traced the call to a small compound in the mountain town of Ab Khail, near the border with Pakistan. When those inside refused to submit to a search, the U.S. patrol began exchanging fire with four or five men armed with grenades and assault rifles.

After air strikes were called in and multiple bombing raids had all but levelled the mud-brick huts, a small assault force entered the compound on foot to sweep out the remaining fighters. Someone in the compound began firing at the soldiers, who quickly took cover. What happened next only became clear in February of this year, after a 2004 Criminal Investigation Task Force witness report was accidentally released to the media.

The witness interviewed in the report, the soldier who shot Khadr, is identified only as OC-1. His description of the throwing of the grenade that would precipitate Khadr’s murder charge reads as follows:

“As the fire continued, [OC-1] saw a hand grenade ‘lobbed’ over the corner wall that lead [sic] into the alley. He estimated the wall was about eight feet tall. The grenade went over his head in an arching pattern. The grenade traveled approximately 30 to 80 feet with the distance depending on how deep from in the alley the grenade was thrown. The grenade landed and [sic] estimated 30 to 50 feet from the opening of the alley.”

Though OC-1 did not hear the grenade explode, it is alleged that this was the weapon that fatally wounded Sgt. Christopher J. Speer. And Omar Khadr stands accused of wielding it.

It was initially alleged that Khadr was seen to have thrown the grenade, but no eyewitness reports have yet surfaced to corroborate this claim. Indeed, the operation’s military commander, identified only as “Col. W,” initially reported that the man suspected of throwing the grenade had been killed in the fighting. Early this year, however, Khadr’s lawyers revealed that Col. W’s report had been altered months later to read that the suspect had merely been “engaged” rather than “killed,” provoking an accusation that the U.S. military was “manufactur[ing] evidence to make it look like Omar is guilty.”

After the grenade sailed over his head, OC-1 heard moaning coming from the back of the compound and saw a man lying on the ground within reach of an AK-47. Seeing that the man was moving, OC-1 shot him once in the head, stirring up a cloud of dust. Once the dust had settled, OC-1 “saw a second man sitting up facing away from him leaning against brush. This man, later identified as KHADR, was moving.” Khadr had by then been wounded in the head, eye, and leg by shrapnel, presumably from the earlier aerial bombardment or perhaps from a U.S. grenade. The 15-year-old was wounded and unarmed, and was facing away from the approaching soldier. According to his report, OC-1 shot Khadr twice in the back.

OC-1 stated that he had been the only American to fire his weapon since entering the compound, although he admitted that at least one American grenade had been thrown into the compound from outside the walls after the team had entered. Khadr’s lawyer, Bill Kuebler, has argued that this raises the possibility that the grenade that killed Speer had been thrown by a U.S. soldier, rather than by anyone inside the compound. Kuebler has indicated that he will present forensic evidence at Khadr’s trial to corroborate this claim.

Approaching the wounded Khadr, OC-1 reported that he “tapped” the motionless boy’s wounded eye to confirm that he was alive. Khadr was then given on-site medical attention, during which time he repeatedly asked the medics and soldiers to kill him. He was then loaded aboard a military helicopter and flown to the detention centre at Bagram Airbase. When he regained consciousness several days later, Khadr claims that the first thing he was told was that he “had killed an American with a hand grenade.”

“Several times, he forced me to [redacted], which caused me [redacted] due to my [redacted].”

Six years of torture and abuse

Some basic facts of Omar Khadr’s story are not disputed. His father was an Egyptian-Canadian aid worker who had ties to numerous militant leaders including Osama bin Laden. He was a suspected member of al Qaeda, and was killed in a raid by Pakistani troops in October 2003. On the day the U.S. army came knocking, Omar Khadr, who speaks English, Pashto, and Arabic, had been loaned out by his father to act as an interpreter for Abu Laith al-Libi, an al-Qaeda leader. (The young Khadr had been living with his mother at the time and had been forced to hide behind a burka, disguised as a girl, to escape scrutiny. Upset by having to disguise himself as a girl in order to be safe, Khadr had asked to live with men in the village instead.) Video footage found at the compound shows Omar Khadr playing with a detonator cord while other men assemble explosives. But none of these facts make him a terrorist, nor do they justify the treatment he has endured since his capture.

As Human Rights Watch points out in their 2007 report “The Omar Khadr Case: A Teenager Imprisoned at Guantanamo,” “Both US and international law requires governments to provide children (persons under the age of 18) with special safeguards and care, including legal protections appropriate to their age.”

“While children should be held accountable for their crimes,” the report continues, “international law requires that they be treated in a manner that takes into account their particular vulnerability and relative culpability as children, and focuses primarily on rehabilitation and reintegration.” Surveying the litany of abuses Omar Khadr has endured in the six years since his capture, it is hard to imagine a treatment regimen better designed to destroy utterly an adolescent’s chances for “rehabilitation and reintegration.”

One might think that Khadr’s youth would have served as a mitigating factor that would have limited the extent of his mistreatment, but two factors conspired to ensure Khadr would be shown no mercy. First, he was considered an “intelligence treasure trove” because of his family’s high-ranking contacts in al Qaeda (Khadr spent part of his childhood living alongside Osama bin Laden himself, and playing with the bin Laden children). In an extra-judicial detention system obsessed with “ticking-time-bomb” scenarios and “actionable intelligence,” this made him an irresistible candidate for torture. Secondly, Khadr was accused of killing a U.S. soldier, which immediately earned him the animosity of almost every other U.S. soldier he encountered. Together, these factors virtually guaranteed that he would receive the sort of “gloves-off” treatment from his captors and interrogators that Bush and then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had directly called for.

At the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, where Omar Khadr spent the first two months of his detention, his interrogators barely waited until he had regained consciousness before they went to work. He was often carried into the interrogation room on a stretcher and was regularly denied pain medication prior to and during his interrogations. He was subjected to barking dogs, threatened with rape, denied bathroom privileges, singled out for all-night cleaning duty long before his wounds had healed, and hung up by his wrists in doorways for hours at a time.

Further abuses detailed by Khadr in a sworn affidavit have been blacked out by military censors. For instance, Khadr’s censored description of his first interrogation reads as follows:

“During this first interrogation, the young blond man would often [redacted] if I did not give him the answers he wanted. Several times, he forced me to [redacted], which caused me [redacted] due to my [redacted]. He did this several times to get me to answer his questions and give him the answers he wanted. It was clear that he was making me [redacted] because he knew that [redacted] and he wanted me to answer questions. I cried several times during the interrogation as a result of this treatment and pain.”

Whatever the specifics, such treatment quickly had its desired effect. Khadr, who was once described by a teacher as “very smart, very eager and very polite,” realized almost immediately that “the more I answered the questions and the more I gave him the answers he wanted, the less [redacted] on me. I figured out right away that I would simply tell them whatever I thought they wanted to hear in order to keep them from causing me [redacted].” A U.S. official quoted in an Amnesty International report cites Khadr as an example of a prisoner “singing like a bird” out of fear of abuse by U.S. interrogators.

Khadr estimates that he was interrogated 42 times over a 90-day period while at Bagram. He was then transferred to Guantanamo, where many of the torture techniques he had already encountered were soon to be enshrined as official U.S. policy, authorized by President Bush himself. At Guantanamo, Khadr was beaten; drugged; ridiculed; subjected to sleep deprivation; subjected to solitary confinement and sensory deprivation; choked repeatedly to the point of passing out; force-fed and beaten after he participated in a detainee hunger strike; and, in one oft-cited incident, denied the use of a bathroom until he lost control of his bladder and was used as a “human mop” to clean up the puddle of urine, then refused a change of clothes for two days. He was also threatened with extradition to Israel, Egypt, Jordan or Syria where he would, he was led to believe, be raped and tortured.

This is, again, only a partial list, as the U.S. military has refused to release details of many of the “enhanced interrogation techniques” used on Guantanamo detainees, and has censored detainee communications that give details of this treatment, citing concerns that terrorists might use the information to prepare themselves to better resist U.S. interrogation methods.

The psychological effects of such a harsh regimen of torture and abuse on someone of Khadr’s age were entirely predictable. “Soon after Omar arrived at Guantanamo,” writes Jeff Tietz in his Rolling Stone exposé, “The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr,”

“he began exhibiting the kinds of dissociative [sic] symptoms most adolescent psychiatrists would have expected. He was startled to the point of disorientation by small changes in his surroundings. He had fainting spells. He cried frequently. [ . . . ] His appetite diminished; he took on the appearance of the permanently malnourished. He entered what clinicians call a state of hypervigilance: He started thinking he might be attacked at any time - without reason, his heart rate would jump, and he would sweat and hyperventilate. He began hearing sounds - screams, bombs, things he could not identify - when the cellblock was silent. Every week or so, a self-generated rage possessed him - an experience wholly foreign to his character. For long periods he felt no emotion at all. He started blaming himself for the things that had happened to him; he became deeply ashamed of what he had suffered. He developed a pronounced twitch on the left side of his face, of which he remained unaware.”

Meanwhile, Khadr’s ordeal dragged on with no end in sight. It wasn’t until three years after reaching Guantanamo that Khadr was even charged with a crime. He was not provided access to legal counsel until late 2004, more than two years after his transfer. In over six years of detention, he has been allowed to speak to his family by telephone only once and his family has never been permitted to visit him.

The London-based Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has been closely following the case of Omar Khadr, the world’s highest profile child soldier. According to Lucia Withers of the Coalition, Khadr “should have been treated primarily as a child and a victim of adult illegality. His treatment should have focused on maximizing his potential for successful reintegration. His treatment, including indefinite military detention, lack of access to family and lawyers, lack of judicial review and allegations that he has been ill-treated, have been manifestly contrary to these principles.” The Coalition is calling for Khadr’s age to be taken into account before judgment is passed in his case, and for his punishment, if he is found guilty, to be consistent with international principles on juvenile justice.

Khadr’s disclosure of torture to Canadian officials cost him dearly.

“They had no sympathy”

One of the ugliest questions to emerge from the released documentation of Canada’s interviews with Khadr is the question of why Khadr was “softened up” with three weeks of sleep deprivation, with the full knowledge of Canadian officials, before their meeting with him. Was it because Canadian officials were actively participating in his interrogation in hopes of bolstering the U.S. case against him, rather than visiting “to ascertain Khadr’s well-being,” as the government claimed at the time, and as Khadr’s rights as a Canadian citizen should have warranted? Assisting with the U.S. prosecution, indeed, appears to have been the primary objective of these meetings.

The Canadian government has repeatedly claimed that it “sought and received assurances” that Khadr was being humanely treated in Guantanamo. The classified documents released in July of this year under court order, however, expose this claim as deceptive: whatever “assurances” they may have received, Canadian officials knew very well that Khadr was being subjected to harsh and inhumane interrogation methods, and didn’t particularly seem to care. They neither protested his treatment nor sought his extradition to Canada. Indeed, as is now clear, they actively participated in his interrogation.

The reports of these interrogation sessions reveal that Canadian officials had full knowledge that Khadr had been subjected to what is known as the “frequent flyer program,” a sleep deprivation method, “in an effort to make him more amenable and willing to talk” prior to a visit with now-retired Canadian foreign service officer Jim Gould in 2004.

“For the three weeks before Mr. Gould’s visit,” reports R. Scott Heatherington, Director of the Canadian Foreign Intelligence Division, “Umar [sic] has not been permitted more than three hours in any one location. At three hour intervals he is moved to another cell block, thus denying him an uninterrupted sleep and a continued change of neighbours. He will soon be placed in isolation for up to three weeks and then he will be interviewed again.”

The Foreign Affairs documents go on to state that on several occasions, Khadr cried uncontrollably, and that he removed his shirt to show interviewers bullet wounds he had suffered to his back and shoulder during the firefight in Afghanistan, some of the wounds still leaking blood. According to a sworn affidavit from Khadr,

“I showed them my injuries and told them that what I had told the Americans was not right and not true. I said that I told the Americans whatever they wanted me to say because they would torture me. The Canadians called me a liar and I began to sob. They screamed at me and told me that they could not do anything for me. I tried to cooperate so that they would take me back to Canada. I told them that I was scared and that I had been tortured.

“They came back three more days but I did not sob because they had no sympathy.”

Heatherington’s report notes coldly, “Mr. Khadr’s allegations and protestations . . . did not ring true.”

Damningly, however, Gould’s very own observations actually lent weight to Khadr’s allegation of torture: in one report Gould expressed frustration with the “inexperience and lack of a goal” of Khadr’s primary interrogator, who “seemed to be trying to intimidate Umar or force Umar to talk rather than trying to cajole him into cooperation.” There is no indication that Gould investigated these suspicions further or lodged any complaint with the Americans about what he observed.

Khadr, it must be remembered, took a major risk in disclosing his mistreatment while still in the custody of his torturers, and his disclosure, so quickly dismissed by Canadian officials, cost him dearly: “After the Canadians left and I told the Americans that my previous statements were untrue, life got much worse for me.” Khadr’s description of the “much worse” punishment he suffered for disclosing his torture is almost entirely redacted.

Canada has consistently refused to call for Khadr’s release. Indeed, as Sean Fine pointed out in the Globe and Mail in March 2008, Canada “is the only Western nation to give the United States carte blanche with one of its nationals at Guantanamo. Britain, Australia, Sweden and Germany fought to repatriate their nationals - adults, all of them. And Canada let a juvenile languish.” Indeed, all other western countries not only tried, but succeeded, in getting their nationals released from Guantanamo. How hard would it have been for Canada to do the same?

Meanwhile, Khadr has not been visited by Canadian officials since 2004, after his attorneys sought and won a Federal Court injunction to prevent the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs from interrogating their client again.

“Legal anarchy”

“What is new about President Bush’s order [‘Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,' November 13, 2001] is that it radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being. Not only do the Taliban captured in Afghanistan not enjoy the status of POWs as defined by the Geneva Convention, they do not even have the status of persons charged with a crime according to American laws. Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees,’ they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight.”

Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception

While his lawyers are working to establish a rehabilitative program that would see Khadr returned to Canada under a program of extensive rehabilitation, monitoring and limited family contact, neither the U.S. nor the Canadian government has publicly expressed any support for such a plan. Prime Minister Stephen Harper insists that there is no other option for Khadr than to continue with the controversial U.S. military tribunals. “Frankly, we do not have a real alternative to that process now to get to the truth about those accusations, and we believe that this process should continue,” the PM told reporters at the G8 summit in Japan in July.

Such faith that anything resembling justice can yet emerge from Guantanamo puts Harper among a very small number of neo-conservative Pollyannas who maintain that the Guantanamo “process” should be allowed to work. As early as June 2007, the editorial in the Toronto Star condemned the “legal anarchy” of a process in which “Washington appears determined to rewrite the rules until it manages to secure a conviction.” The Globe and Mail, meanwhile, pointed out in its editorial of July 10, 2008, “The issue is not, as Mr. Harper implies, that Canada’s justice system lacks the legal tools to deal with Mr. Khadr. It is that, by Canadian notions of fair process, the U.S. case against Mr. Khadr would unravel.”

Particularly since the release of the Canadian interrogation footage, Canadian public opinion has increasingly shifted to favour bringing Khadr into the Canadian justice system. As of press time, it remains to be seen whether public pressure can force the Canadian government to abandon its hard-line stance, or whether this quasi-judicial prosecution of a Canadian child soldier based on a confession extracted under torture will be allowed to proceed.

Meanwhile, whatever crimes Khadr may have committed, the list of crimes committed against the youth by those who have held him in legal limbo for the past six years is surely much longer. Justice for Omar Khadr requires not just a free and fair legal process in which the now-21-year-old can defend himself against the serious charges he faces. Justice also requires that those who have manipulated and abused him for their own political ends also be held to account. If prosecuting war crimes is our intention, then let’s not limit ourselves to the war crimes of children and foot soldiers.

Perhaps fearing precisely such an outbreak of judicial zeal, the Bush Administration saw to it that the same Military Commissions Act of 2006 that stripped Guantanamo detainees of their habeas corpus rights and ruled coerced testimony to be admissible against them also gutted the War Crimes Act of 1996 in order to protect U.S. policy-makers (from Bush and Cheney on down) from prosecution for war crimes.

In June of this year, Khadr responded to questions sent to him by CBC News in a handwritten letter, saying “I’m a peaceful person,” and asking the Canadian people to “give me a chance in life and don’t believe what you’ve heard, and believe what you see with your own eyes.”

Dave Oswald Mitchell is the editor of Briarpatch Magazine. Brent Erickson is an artist, activist and independent journalist based in Winnipeg.

Further reading

OC-1’s witness report

Affidavit of Omar Khadr

The Canadian interrogation files

60 Minutes segment: “Omar Kadr: The Youngest Terrorist?”
(November 18, 2007)

Andy Worthington, “Guantanamo’s Child Soldier: The Trials of Omar Khadr”
Counterpunch, November 15, 2007

Trial Watch’s profile on Omar Khadr

Petition Stephen Harper to bring Omar Khadr home

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By Thomas Walkom
The Toronto Star
January 18, 2008

American Defence Secretary Robert Gates may well be right when he says that Canadian and European troops in Afghanistan are not well equipped to fight a counter-insurgency campaign. But what has been lost in the controversy over his impolitic remarks is that we did not sign on to fight insurgents – there or anywhere else.

The International Stabilization and Assistance Force, which NATO now commands and which includes some 2,500 Canadian soldiers, was set up in late 2001 by the United Nations to do just what its name suggests – stabilize a country emerging from years of civil war and assist the fledgling Kabul government in its redevelopment efforts.

Fighting the Taliban (or, as they were called then, the Taliban “remnants”) was a job that Washington insisted on reserving to itself through what it called Operation Enduring Freedom.

Canada helped out in that one too, sending troops to serve under U.S. command in 2002. But in those days, America wanted to keep its sometimes squeamish allies well away from a dark war that was aimed primarily at capturing terror suspects and transferring them to interrogators at Guantanamo Bay.

It was only after 2003, when the U.S. found itself troop-short and bogged down in Iraq, that Washington changed the rules of engagement for its allies. Gradually, Afghanistan became NATO’s war. Washington’s plan then was to gradually reduce its 20,000 troop commitment to Afghanistan and switch them over to Iraq.

Which is why, since 2006, Canadian troops have found themselves under fire in the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar.

It’s worth remembering that we keep sending soldiers to Afghanistan not because Canada has been attacked by the Taliban, but because our friends, the Americans, feel they are at war with them.

The Dutch are in southern Afghanistan for the same reason. So are the British – who have paid a severe price at home for their decision to support Washington’s various anti-Islamist wars.

That’s why Gates’ comments rub so raw in this and other NATO countries. Since 2001, one Canadian diplomat and 77 soldiers have died in Afghanistan. More than 250 more have been wounded in action. Yet this was never our war. It was always America’s.

The U.S. chose to declare Afghanistan the enemy after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Had Washington elected to avenge 9/11 by invading the country from which most of those terrorists came, Canadian troops would now be fighting in Saudi Arabia.

Their call, their war, their show.

Now, Washington has shifted its focus again. On Tuesday, the Pentagon announced it will send an additional 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan – bringing the total number of U.S. troops there to more than 30,000.

It is in this context that Gates made his remarks. In effect, the American public is being told that its soldiers have to fix Afghanistan because the pusillanimous Europeans and invisible Canadians aren’t up to the job. Or, as the Washington Post noted editorially: “It’s becoming clear that the war must be won by U.S. troops, and not by NATO.”

Which, in the broader scheme of things, is just fine. Let America, freshly confident after its counterinsurgency successes in Iraq and Vietnam, finish its own war itself. Then Canadian troops can come back to Canada. And the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can refocus on the North Atlantic.

Thomas Walkom’s column normally appears Thursday and Sunday.

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By Jon Elmer
Briarpatch Magazine
February 2008

Blackwater: The rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army
Jeremy Scahill
Nation Books 2007

The Shock Doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism
Naomi Klein
Knopf Canada 2007

The Global War On Terror did not give birth to mercenary warfare: the Pharaohs used mercenaries, as did the Persians, Napoleon and Alexander the Great. The Romans and the British deployed soldiers-for-hire to police native rebellions, particularly in the twilight of their empires. Indeed, 19th century American industrialists and statesmen, lionized in so many textbooks and park monuments, made private security forces-particularly the infamous Pinkertons-an integral element in American social and political history. As Pinkerton was to private policing in the U.S. in the 19th century, Blackwater USA is to the American military of the 21st century: a symbolic expression of systemic capitalist forces running far deeper than a single company.

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What a difference a single word makes. This article only scratches the surface of the absurdity of the US’s efforts to try a child soldier for attempting to kill a soldier of an invading army — who was at that very moment trying to kill him. Never mind that the New York Times, among other fine news establishments, refers to this child soldier as a “terrorist” with a straight face.

Generally speaking, it is illegal for ordinary people to kill other ordinary people. But the laws of war recognize that during an armed conflict, combatants on one side are supposed to try to kill combatants on the other side. If they are later captured, the opposing forces can detain them until the end of hostilities but can’t try them for murder. They have “combatant immunity”: If they killed opposing combatants, they were just doing their job.

What, then, is an “unlawful enemy combatant”? The Bush administration has long been fond of tossing around the phrase, but until the 2006 military commissions law, it had zero legal meaning.

[...]

Reading between the lines, it appears that the judges thought that the Bush administration wanted to have its cake and eat it too: declare all terror suspects “enemy combatants” in a “war on terror” and also try them for actions such as seeking to kill U.S. troops in that war. But you can’t have it both ways; under the laws of war, if Al Qaeda suspects are combatants, it’s not unlawful for them to kill U.S. troops.

[Full article.]

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Your monthly media supplement of seven recommended readings from beyond the Briarpatch.

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1. Iraq: Send in the Clown
by Emine Saner
The Guardian
May 17, 2007

“It is hard to imagine how Jo Wilding’s kidnappers reacted when she told them what she was doing in Iraq. They were in Fallujah, a city under siege in 2003 - and this British woman was claiming to be a clown, in a circus she had brought to a country in the middle of a war.”

http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/05/17/1274/

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